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As part of financial market infrastructures, central counterparties (CCPs) have long been deemed 
systemically important and are likely to gain in importance due to the regulatory developments 
mandating central clearing for an increasing number of financial products. This paper focuses on the 
regulation as well as the recovery and resolution of CCPs in Europe. The existing CCP regulatory 
framework consists of ex-ante measures, including, among others, capital and liquidity requirements, 
initial and variation margins, and loss sharing mechanisms. In addition, the European proposal for the 
recovery and resolution of CCPs (the Proposal) contains several ex-post regulatory measures mainly 
in the form of rules for recovery and orderly resolution.  
Having studied the prudential regulatory measures for CCPs contained in the European Market 
Infrastructure Regulation and the ex-post recovery and resolution measures of the Proposal, this paper 
puts a spotlight on the specific shortcomings of the existing and proposed rules, in particular in terms 
of misaligned incentives, externalities, collective action problems, and certain practical impediments, 
and concludes that it would be misguided to inordinately rely on ex-post measures. Highlighting the 
limitations of the recovery and resolution mechanisms, this paper proposes that given the systemic 
importance of CCP functions, it is critical to improve the ex-ante measures whose objective is to 
prevent the failure of a CCP, rather than ex-post measures, which kick in after its failure. 
Accordingly, recommendations for making such improvements are proposed.   
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Introduction 
Financial market infrastructures (FMIs) consist of payment systems, trading venues, securities 
settlement systems (including central securities depositories (CSDs)), central clearing counterparties 
(CCPs), and trade repositories. Together, they constitute the plumbing of the financial system, which 
helps facilitate payments and trade in financial instruments. Within the greater FMI, CCPs play a key 
role in the well-functioning of the financial markets. A CCP is a legal person interposing itself 
between the counterparties to a trade, becoming the buyer to every seller and the seller to every 
buyer.1 ‘Clearing’ refers to the processes and activities carried out between trade and settlement. It 
concerns establishing positions such as calculation of net obligations, and ensuring the availability of 
financial instruments, cash, or both to secure the exposures arising from those positions.2 A 
derivatives contract is said to be cleared when the performance of the buyer and the seller is 
guaranteed by a CCP. Due to the different nature of derivatives contracts and their prolonged 
settlement date, CCPs first emerged in derivatives markets. However, they have recently made 
inroads into trading of broader array of securities such as stocks and bonds.3  
Unlike banks and the shadow banking system, CCPs played a key role in the global financial crisis 
(GFC) in containing the propagation of risks and contagion of financial shocks, which otherwise 
could have led to a far deeper disruption during the crisis. This made CCPs the unlikely heroes of the 
GFC. For example, in the Lehman Bankruptcy, which put many markets across the globe in financial 
distress, CCPs played a key role in preventing further propagation of risks.4 By the same token, 
European CCPs were successful in handling the financial and sovereign debt crisis, while themselves 
escaping the crisis unscathed.  
CCPs’ success in mitigating counterparty risks in the financial markets convinced international 
standard setters and national regulators to pivot on these entities in the post-trade processes by 
requiring higher levels of CCP clearing, especially for particular classes of financial instruments such 
as standardized over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives. On both sides of the Atlantic, laws and 
regulations were passed to require the mandatory central clearing of increasing number and types of 
financial contracts. In the U.S., the central clearing of standardized derivatives was mandated by Title 
VII of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, and in the EU, such 
mandatory clearing was established by the European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR).5 
Although CCPs reduce risk and contribute to the efficiency of financial markets in terms of reducing 
capital requirements for banks, facilitating collateral management and contributing to the liquidity of 
                                                        
1 Art. 2(1), Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2012 on OTC derivatives, 
central counterparties and trade repositories, OJ L 201, 27.7.2012. (Hereinafter, EMIR) 
2 Art. 2(3), EMIR 
3 CCPs first appeared in the 1970s in the U.S. stocks markets and then in Europe in 1990s, with the pioneering introduction 
of an equities CCP for the Paris Stock Exchange. See: Peter Norman, The Risk Controllers: Central Counterparty Clearing 
in Globalised Financial Markets (Chichester, West Sussex: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., 2011), 12. 
4 Ibid., Chapter 1., chapter 1. 
5 Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2012 on OTC derivatives, central 
counterparties and trade repositories, OJ L 201, 27.7.2012. 
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markets, they aggregate, concentrate and centralize risks.6 The mounting concerns about CCPs have 
become all the more important in the wake of the GFC, in which international fora and standard 
setters, such as the Group of Twenty (G20), moved towards encouraging regulatory reforms requiring 
central clearing of standardized OTC derivatives. Such reforms can transform CCPs into critical 
nodes in the financial markets the failure of which could lead to the disruption of the financial sector 
as well as the real economy.7 In addition to such regulatory developments in OTC derivatives 
markets, an increasing number of other financial products such as repurchase agreements (repos) are 
being cleared by CCPs.8  
By default, the regulation of FMIs mainly relies on the ex-ante measures, which allow CCPs to 
operate safely and to absorb minor losses. In the EU, this prudential framework is provided in EMIR 
and applies equally to all CCPs, regardless of their legal nature. Under rare circumstances, when all 
prudential safeguards have failed, the treatment of CCPs differs based on their legal nature. CCPs that 
are banks or operate under a banking license can make use of the bank recovery and resolution 
directive (BRRD), whereas there is no equivalent recovery and resolution framework for non-bank 
CCPs at the moment. To fill this gap, as well as to provide for a harmonized recovery and resolution 
framework for all CCPs, the European Commission (the Commission) has issued the European 
proposal for the recovery and resolution of CCPs (the Proposal),9 which is currently under discussion. 
This paper examines a rather under-investigated research area by shedding some light on the potential 
systemic fault lines in the CCP business and through discussing the respective EU risk management 
and resolution frameworks applicable to such entities. This paper proceeds as follows. The first 
section presents a brief overview of CCPs and their special role in the financial markets along with 
the potential systemic risks that could originate from their failure. Such an overview requires a review 
of the CCP business models with a view to identifying the potential market, institutional or 
organizational failures therein. Second, the paper examines the current ex-ante prudential regulation 
to assess whether the existing regulatory framework can address the potential systemic risks arising 
from CCPs’ core activities. In doing so, the paper discusses the tools under the current regulatory 
regime as well as future developments based on the European proposal for the recovery and resolution 
of CCPs to deal with an extreme financial distress. Fourth, we elaborate on the shortcomings of the 
current framework, and stress the unaddressed risks. Finally, by taking stock of the limitations of the 
existing regulation and proposed rules, we make policy recommendations in order to strengthen the 
current regulatory framework. 
                                                        
6 Umar Faruqui, Wenqian Huang, and Előd Takáts, "Clearing Risks in Otc Derivatives Markets: The Ccp-Bank Nexus," BIS 
Quarterly Review December 2018  (2018): 77-79. 
7 See Darrell Duffie and Haoxiang Zhu, "Does a Central Clearing Counterparty Reduce Counterparty Risk?," The Review of 
Asset Pricing Studies 1, no. 1 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1093/rapstu/rar001. 
8 In repo markets, traditionally, CCPs played a significantly more important role in Europe than in the U.S. Currently, about 
70% of European repo market turnover is being cleared through CCPs. See: International Capital Market Association, 
"Frequently Asked Questions on Repo," ed. International Capital Market Association (ICMA) (2015), 25.. 
9 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on a framework for the recovery and resolution of 
central counterparties and amending Regulations (EU) No 1095/2010, (EU) No 648/2012, and (EU) 2015/2365, 
COM/2016/0856 final - 2016/0365 (COD) 
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1. The CCP risk profile 
1.1. Are CCPs special? 
The argument for specialness of certain financial activities requiring special regulatory framework 
was first raised in banking.10 Offering transaction accounts, providing backup liquidity for all other 
financial and non-financial institutions, and the banks’ role as a transmission belt for monetary policy 
are three features that distinguish banks from other financial and non-financial institutions. In addition 
to provision of payment services, the core banking functions are taking deposits and lending. Such 
functions often involve maturity, liquidity and credit transformation.11 Maturity transformation is 
beneficial because it ultimately encourages long-term capital investments,12 however, it is inherently 
fragile.13 Traditionally, banks had a monopoly on maturity transformation because they were the only 
institutions licensed to issue demand deposits.14 In addition to government safety nets,15 banks have 
developed specific arrangements to address risks involved in maturity transformation, which is mainly 
reflected in their liquidity policies. These policies often involve limiting the extent of the maturity 
                                                        
10 E. Gerald Corrigan, "Are Banks Special?," (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, 1982).. See also: Alan J. Marcus, 
"Deregulation and Bank Financial Policy," Journal of Banking & Finance 8, no. 4 (1984). https://doi.org/10.1016/S0378-
4266(84)80046-1.; E. Gerald Corrigan, 2000.; Eugene F Fama, "What's Different About Banks?," Journal of monetary 
economics 15, no. 1 (1985).; Eugene F Fama, "Banking in the Theory of Finance," Journal of monetary economics 6, no. 1 
(1980). 
However, other scholars do not agree with the ‘specialness’ argument for banks. For example, See Anat R. Admati and 
Martin Hellwig, The Bankers' New Clothes: What's Wrong with Banking and What to Do About It (Princeton, New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 2013). 
11 Heremans Dirk, "Regulation of Banking and Financial Markets," in Encyclopedia of Law and Economics Volume 9, ed. 
Roger J. Van den Bergh and Alessio M. Pacces (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2011).. More often than not, the 
maturity transformation in banking is accompanied by liquidity transformation; however, there might be instances that banks 
engage in liquidity transformation without engaging in maturity transformation.                                   
12 Financial Services Authority, The Turner Review: A Regulatory Response to the Global Banking Crisis (2009), 21.; See 
also  Gary B. Gorton, Misunderstanding Financial Crises: Why We Don't See Them Coming (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2012).  
13 The fragility of maturity transformation arises from the nature of maturity mismatch between assets (long-term loans) and 
liabilities (demand deposits), which historically resulted in recurrent bank runs and panics. See: Tobias Adrian and Adam B. 
Ashcraft, "Shadow Banking Regulation," Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Report, no. 559 (2012): 1.; Charles P. 
Kindleberger and Robert Z. Aliber, Manias, Panics, and Crashes: A History of Financial Crises, vol. 5 (Hoboken, New 
Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2005). 
14 Gary B. Gorton, Slapped by the Invisible Hand: The Panic of 2007 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010). 
15 In addition to banks’ internal risk mitigating strategies, deposit insurance funds guarantee bank deposits up to certain 
limits. Deposit insurance is primarily introduced to prevent bank runs and panics, thereby to sustain financial stability. See: 
Alan S. Blinder and Robert F. Wescott, "Reform of Deposit Insurance: A Report to the Fdic," (2001).; Charles W Calomiris, 
"Is Deposit Insurance Necessary? A Historical Perspective," The Journal of Economic History 50, no. 02 (1990)..  
Further, banks are provided with access to the ‘discount window’ or the ‘lender of last resort’ (LOLR) facilities of central 
banks. 
The LOLR function of central banks is devised to prevent bank runs on illiquid but solvent banks when they have liquidity 
problems due to their inability to borrow from interbank market or other central bank facilities. See Xavier Freixas et al., 
"Lender of Last Resort: What Have We Learned since Bagehot?," Journal of Financial Services Research 18, no. 1 (2000).; 
Xavier Freixas and Bruno M. Parigi, "The Lender of Last Resort of the 21st Century," in The First Global Financial Crisis 
of the 21st Century: Part Ll June-December 2008, ed. Andrew Felton and Carmen M. Reinhart (VoxEU.org Publication, 
2009), 163-67.; Carlos Garcia-de-Andoain et al., "Lending-of-Last-Resort Is as Lending-of-Last-Resort Does: Central Bank 
Liquidity Provision and Interbank Market Functioning in the Euro Area," ECB Working Paper Series No 1886  (2016). 
Historically, the LOLR function in the market was played by private financial institutions. A bold example of taking up of 
such a role in the crisis of 1907 was J. P. Morgan’s provision of liquidity to markets and institutions in the banking panic of 
that year. See Robert F. Bruner and Sean D. Carr, The Panic of 1907: Lessons Learned from the Market's Perfect Storm 
(Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2007). However, after the 1913, the year in which the Federal Reserve 
came into being, it took up such a function. All these protections are to ensure that banking entities’ main functions, i.e., 
maturity transformation, and their role in payment system are not impaired because of sudden liquidity shocks. 
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transformation of banks and insurance via committed credit lines from other banks,16 or borrowing 
from interbank repo markets. 
Given the increasingly important role of CCPs in the financial markets, the same argument for 
specialness can be put forward for these entities. Although, as the term ‘clearing bank’ suggests, 
clearing has traditionally fallen within the realm of the banking industry,17 CCP functions and 
business models are thoroughly different from the core banking functions.18 A need for differential 
regulatory treatment can best be understood in light of CCPs’ unique functions in the financial system 
and their potential costs and benefits for the economy at large. In this view, CCPs occupy a relatively 
sui generis position in financial markets and provide financial systems with ‘special’ benefits. For 
instance, CCPs mitigate systemic risk by acting as a circuit breaker when risks of defaults tend to 
propagate from one counterparty to another. This is made possible through either novation or open 
offer. Novation extinguishes the original contract between the buyer and the seller and replaces it with 
two new contracts: one between the buyer and the CCP, and the other between the seller and the CCP. 
This way, the CCP interposes itself between the original buyer and seller and becomes the buyer to 
the seller and the seller to the buyer. In contrast, under open offer, as the CCP immediately interposes 
itself between the buyer and the seller in a transaction at the very moment of its inception, no 
contractual relationship between the buyer and the seller is created ab initio and two separate 
contracts are formed: one between the buyer and the CCP and the other between the CCP and the 
seller.19 This way, a CCP insulates both buyers and sellers from the credit risk of the counterparties to 
a trade. 
By standing in between counterparties, CCPs reduce the risks of panic reaction to solvency problems 
of a single counterparty and decrease the likelihood of sudden failure of chains of counterparties. 
Additionally, they enhance transparency regarding counterparty credit risk, which enables both 
market participants and regulators to have a better understanding and assessment of counterparty risks 
in the financial system, leading to greater financial stability. CCPs also monitor and ensure the 
uniform application of collateral requirements on all clearing members.20 Furthermore, central 
clearing with fewer CCPs lowers the average counterparty risk through netting.21 
                                                        
16 Authority Financial Services, "The Turner Review: A Regulatory Response to the Global Banking Crisis," (2009), 21. 
17 David Loader, Clearing, Settlement and Custody, Second ed. (Oxford: Elsevier Butterworth-Heinemann, 2014), Chapter 
1. 
18 Mark Jozsef Manning and David Hughes, "Central Counterparties and Banks: Vive La Difference," Journal of Financial 
Market Infrastructures 4, no. 3 (2016).; David Hughes and Mark Manning, "Ccps and Banks: Different Risks, Different 
Regulations," Reserve Bank of Australia Bulletin  (December 2015). ; Robert T. Cox and Robert S Steigerwald, "A Ccp Is a 
Ccp Is a Ccp," Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago WP2004-2 PDP, no. 2017-1 (April 2017).; Manmohan Singh and Dermot 
Turing, "Central Counterparty Resolution: An Unresolved Problem," IMF Working Paper WP/18/65  (2018). 
19 Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems and Technical Committee of the International Organization of Securities 
Commissions, "Recommendations for Central Counterparties: Consultative Report,"  (March 2004).; For more details see: Jo 
Braithwaite and David Murphy, "Central Counterparties (Ccps) and the Law of Default Management," Journal of Corporate 
Law Studies  (2017). https://doi.org/10.1080/14735970.2016.1254448; Jo Braithwaite and David Murphy, "Got to Be 
Certain: The Legal Framework for Ccp Default Management Processes," Bank of England Financial Stability Paper No. 37  
(2016).; Braithwaite and Murphy, "Central Counterparties (Ccps) and the Law of Default Management."; 
20 Darrell Duffie, "Replumbing Our Financial System: Uneven Progress," International Journal of Central Banking 9, no. 1 
(2013): 267. 
21 Duffie and Zhu, "Does a Central Clearing Counterparty Reduce Counterparty Risk?." 
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However, the main difference between CCP business model and banking business model in that CCPs 
function on a matched-book basis. Namely, every position they take on the asset side of the balance 
sheet is offset and matched by an opposite position on the liability side of the balance sheet. 
Therefore, although a CCP faces various risks such as counterparty risk, liquidity risk, market risk, 
and operational risks, the main risk to which a CCP is exposed is the ‘replacement cost risk’ mainly 
stemming from counterparty risk.22 Therefore, given their specific features and idiosyncratic risks to 
which CCPs are exposed, there seems to be a consensus that there is a need for a special regulatory 
regime for CCPs. 
1.2. CCP systemic risk arising from core functions and operations 
Starting from the classic market failure argument, regulation is only justified when there is distortion 
to competition, information asymmetry or (systemic) externalities. In the case of competition, for 
example, there have been concerns that competition among CCPs could result in a race to the bottom 
and eventually lead to reduced and loosened clearing membership,23 collateral and margin 
requirements. To alleviate such concerns, it is suggested that fewer, but closely supervised CCPs 
should be the goal for regulators, as greater number of CCPs can also make supervision of CCPs 
difficult.24 However, this might not be the optimal policy recommendation as the main risks of a CCP 
to the financial system stem from the lack of substitutability. This fact favours encouraging enhanced 
levels of competition and lowering barriers to entry in the CCP business, even at the expense of 
certain forgone economies of scale and network effects. 
The most important market failure in the CCP business model, though, is systemic externalities. The 
main sources of such externalities are counterparty risk, liquidity risk, and market risk.25 Major risks 
in the CCPs originate from their core activities, namely, becoming a buyer to every seller and a seller 
to every buyer, giving rise to counterparty risk and increasing CCPs’ interconnectedness with their 
clearing members. This risk is further magnified in the case of derivatives contracts than in the case of 
equity and debt securities. The CCP, by way of novation or open offer, assumes the risk of default 
between the time of trade and settlement. This time is often significantly shorter in the case of 
securities trade (i.e., maximum T+3),26 however, the settlement of a derivative instrument can be as 
short as that of securities or can take as long as decades. During this time span, the CCP is exposed to 
the risk of default of a counterparty. And since the risk is concentrated, there is concern that such a 
concentrated risk in the financial market would trigger a financial crisis. 
                                                        
22 Hughes and Manning, "Ccps and Banks: Different Risks, Different Regulations." 
23 For a discussion of these requirements, see: Jo Braithwaite, "The Dilemma of Client Clearing in the Otc Derivatives 
Markets," European Business Organization Law Review 17, no. 3 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s40804-016-0044-0. 
24 Duffie, "Replumbing Our Financial System: Uneven Progress," 254. 
25 David Elliott, "Central Counterparty Loss-Allocation Rules," Bank of England Financial Stability Paper No. 20 20 (April 
2013): 5-6. 
26 T+3 means the trade date plus three days settlement cycle. 
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In addition to the losses stemming from a clearing member default, a CCP might be exposed to losses 
originating from other sources, such as the credit and market risk arising from the reinvestment of the 
cash margin and default fund contributions received from their clearing members, the risk of default 
by a payment or settlement bank, the risk of fraud or other operational risks.27 In principle, a CCP 
cannot use default waterfall to cover such losses, instead, it should rely on its own capital. Therefore, 
in as much as a CCP is exposed to the failure of clearing members, the failure of a CCP due to such 
risks can also affect other clearing members. However, the risks stemming from such risks are kept in 
check by private arrangements as the loss-allocation arrangements between clearing members and 
CCPs strive to ensure that participants could participate both in the risks and returns of such 
activities.28 
In addition, there are risks of interconnectedness of CCP activities with other banking and non-
banking activities stemming from the amalgamation of those activities in one legal entity.29 For 
example, in the U.S., the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) has been encouraging the 
reforms of the two major clearing banks - Bank of New York Mellon and JP Morgan Chase - because 
they have been operating other businesses as financial intermediaries.30 When banking activities and 
clearing activities comingle within a single firm, the exposures from clearing activity could affect its 
banking business and vice versa. 
1.3. Systemic risk arising from mandating CCP clearing 
In the EU, prior to the GFC, the OTC derivatives markets were largely unregulated. Trading OTC 
derivatives occurred on a bilateral basis and outside regulated organized trading venues, without any 
formal clearing requirements applying to them. However, the distress in the derivatives markets 
during the GFC engendered a reform agenda initiated by the G20. In the ensuing years, the EU 
financial markets witnessed two major developments that transformed the regulatory regime for 
derivatives and led to the transformation of the CCP business.31 The first development concerned the 
introduction of the requirements that mandated the derivatives to be traded on organized exchanges. 
The repatriation of trading of standardized derivatives from the OTC markets to organized trading 
venues, which was agreed upon in Pittsburgh G20 summit in September 2009, was implemented in 
the EU under the 2014 MiFID II/MiFIR framework.32 The underlying idea behind such a move was to 
                                                        
27 David Elliott, "Central Counterparty Loss-Allocation Rules," Bank of England Financial Stability Paper No. 20  (April 
2013): 10. 
28 Ibid. 
29 BCBS et al., "Analysis of Central Clearing Interdependencies,"  (5 July 2017). 
30 Federal Reserve Bank of New York, "Tri-Party Repo Infrastructure Reform," (2018).; For the differences in the clearing 
of repo markets on both sides of the Atlantic, see Songjiwen Wu and Hossein Nabilou, "Repo Markets across the Atlantic: 
Similar but Unalike," European Business Law Review (forthcoming)  (2018). 
31 Though the case for mandatory trading is not as obvious as the case for mandatory CCP clearing. See Niamh Moloney, Eu 
Securities and Financial Markets Regulation, 3 ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 623. 
32 The clearing/margin and reporting requirements imposed by EMIR and trading requirement imposed by MIFID II and 
MiFiR. 
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increase the resilience and transparency of derivatives trading, and regulatory monitoring, operational 
and liquidity risk management.33 
Second was the introduction of the requirement for CCP clearing. Effective June 2016, in Europe, 
EMIR required central clearing of certain standardized OTC derivatives.34 Encouraging central 
clearing is not limited to directly mandating central clearing of financial contracts, but it also includes 
certain indirect incentives for central clearing. For example, under Basel II framework, zero risk-
weights were assigned for the counterparty credit risks to derivatives or securities financing 
transactions (SFTs) and to banks’ credit risk exposure resulting from such transactions outstanding 
with a CCP,35 though supervisors could still require capital to fund such exposures. Although more 
recently such a regulatory subsidy has been replaced by a risk-weighting of 1-3% for banks’ collateral 
exposure to CCPs,36 the overall higher capital requirements for non-centrally cleared derivative 
contracts, introduced as part of the CRD IV package, plays a significant role in encouraging central 
clearing.37  
Nevertheless, such regulatory developments can backfire. As mentioned earlier, there is a clear 
consensus in the financial markets that CCPs do not eliminate risk. They just reallocate and most 
likely centralize it, which gives rise to new vulnerabilities in the financial market as central clearing 
tends to concentrate risks in a few major CCPs.38 In that regard, a new risk management framework 
was introduced. In the next two sections, we sketch and critically assess this framework from a 
prudential (part 2) and recovery and resolution perspective (part 3).  
2.  Prudential regulation of CCPs in Europe 
Since the smooth functioning of an infrastructure, such as a CCP, is fundamental to financial stability, 
the importance of prudential regulation is even more crucial than in the case of banks. Prudential 
regulation of CCPs consists of various micro and macroprudential regulation as well as structural 
regulation, which in many cases share the same attributes of the requirements applicable to banking 
and other financial institutions.39  
                                                        
33 See: Moloney, Eu Securities and Financial Markets Regulation, Chapter VI, Section 4.3. & p. 433.; Financial Stability 
Board, "Implementing Otc Derivatives Market Reforms," (2010), 39-43.. 
34 On the other side of the Atlantic, title VII of the U.S. Dodd-Frank Act introduced similar requirements. 
35 Bank for International Settlements (June 2006), ‘International convergence of capital measurement and capital standards: 
A revised framework’, Comprehensive Version, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. 
See: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, "Capital Requirements for Bank Exposures to Central Counterparties," 
(Basel: Bank for International Settlements, April 2014). 
36 Bank for International Settlements (26 July 2010), ‘The Group of Governors and Heads of Supervision reach broad 
agreement on Basel Committee capital and liquidity reform package’, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, press 
release plus Annex. See Section 21.3. See also: Norman, The Risk Controllers: Central Counterparty Clearing in Globalised 
Financial Markets, 15. 
37 See Art. 429 Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR) 
38 Faruqui, Huang, and Takáts, "Clearing Risks in Otc Derivatives Markets: The Ccp-Bank Nexus." 
39 For an overview of such regulatory objectives and toolkits applicable to banking entities, see Stuart I. Greenbaum, Anjan 
V. Thakor, and Arnoud W. A. Boot, "Objectives of Bank Regulation," in Contemporary Financial Intermediation, ed. Stuart 
I. Greenbaum, Anjan V. Thakor, and Arnoud W. A. Boot (San Diego: Academic Press, 2016).; Richard J. Herring and 
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In Europe, EMIR imposes prudential requirements on CCPs. The existing EMIR framework heavily 
relies on ex-ante measures, which are those that make it unlikely for a CCP to fail. These measures 
consist of a plethora of micro and macroprudential measures, such as capital requirements, margin 
and haircut standards, loss-sharing arrangements, prudential rules on the CCP’s investment policies, 
liquidity requirements, and clearing membership standards.  
However, before overviewing CCP regulation in Europe, it is important to mention that to fend off the 
counterparty risks to which a CCP is exposed due to its core operation (clearing), the CCP often has 
its own risk management toolkit included in its rulebook. As part of its risk management toolkit, a 
CCP collects initial and variation margin from clearing members to manage counterparty risks.40 If 
the initial and variation margin is not adequate to cover the losses, the use of a default waterfall is 
triggered. A pre-funded default fund (also known as ‘guarantee fund’) is the one that mutualizes the 
residual loss among surviving clearing members. The CCP itself may contribute to this fund from its 
own capital. Moreover, the rights of assessment is an additional predetermined amount that is 
contributed by non-defaulting clearing members after the prefunded default funds have been 
completely depleted. At the latest stage comes the CCP’s remaining equity. If losses are larger than 
this equity, CCP becomes insolvent.41 In addition to the above, CCPs often have a recovery toolkit, 
and specific loss allocation rules within their rulebook the aim of which is to ensure that the CCP 
returns to a matched book. 
With respect to the legally mandated prudential safeguards, as a condition for authorization, EMIR 
requires a CCP to have a permanent and available initial capital of at least EUR 7.5 million.42 The 
amount of own resources that the CCP must dedicate is known as the ‘skin in the game’, which 
arguably aligns the interest of clearing members with those of the CCP’s shareholders or 
management. The minimum level of the CCP’s skin in the game is set at 25% of its capital 
requirements, which shall be revised on an annual basis.43 Since CCPs operate on a matched-book 
basis,44 imposing higher levels of capital requirements - although can increase skin in the game – may 
not be very helpful as a microprudential tool.45  
In addition, a CCP should impose margin requirements both on its clearing members and other CCPs 
with whom it has established interoperability arrangements. This margin should be sufficient to cover 
potential exposures, in particular, potential losses originating from “at least 99% of the exposures 
                                                                                                                                                                            
Anthony M. Santomero, "What Is Optimal Financial Regulation?," in The New Financial Architecture: Banking Regulation 
in the Twenty-First Century., ed. Benton E. Gup (Westport, Connecticut: Quorum Books, 2000). 
40 In case a clearing member defaults on paying the variation margin, the CCP might be exposed to market risks as it needs 
to enter into an offsetting or hedging transaction or auction off the defaulting members positions to the non-defaulting 
clearing members. In the meantime, the prices of the assets could move against the CCP, which could expose it to market 
risk; initial margin is a protection against this market risk.  
41 Elliott, "Central Counterparty Loss-Allocation Rules," 5-6. 
42 Art. 16 EMIR 
43 Art. 35 (2). Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 153/2013 of 19 December 2012 supplementing Regulation (EU) 
No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to regulatory technical standards on requirements 
for central counterparties, OJ L 52, 23.2.2013.  
44 Meaning that any change in the value of CCPs claims against one clearing member is exactly matched by an opposite 
change in the opposite direction in the value of its claim against another clearing member. 
45 Instead, it seems that the most relevant microprudential requirement for CCPs would be liquidity requirements. 
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movements over an appropriate time horizon”.46 Although CCPs are allowed to practice portfolio 
margining,47 they are prohibited from using the margins posted by non-defaulting clearing members 
to cover the losses stemming from the default of another clearing member.48 
Ex-ante regulation of CCPs can also include macroprudential requirements such as countercyclical 
margin requirements. Mitigating procyclicality of margin requirements in derivatives transactions has 
been a major policy objective in regulating CCPs. The EU approach aims to contribute to financial 
stability through making it unnecessary for the CCPs to exert liquidity pressures on clearing members 
in times of distress. EMIR’s main objective from setting margin requirements is microprudential, i.e., 
safeguarding individual CCPs, however, cognizant of the potential procyclicality of margin 
requirements, it requires CCPs to take the procyclical consequences of margin requirements into 
account in setting and enforcing their margining policy. Moreover, there is considerable support, in 
particular, by the European Central Bank (ECB), to include the macroprudential intervention tools in 
EMIR by granting authorities the power of setting time-varying margins and haircut requirements on 
derivative transactions to limit the procyclicality of margins and haircuts.49 
A CCP is also required to fully collateralize its exposures to all its clearing members or other CCPs on 
a daily basis.50 EMIR only sets qualitative standards for collateral to be accepted by the CCP, but 
ultimately, it is the CCP that decides what to accept and what not to accept as collateral.51 To cover its 
exposures to its clearing members, a CCP should only accept highly liquid collateral with minimal 
credit and market risks. Adequate haircuts should also be applied to collateral proportional to its risk 
profile.52 To mitigate potential counterparty risk stemming from the medium of settlement, to the 
extent possible, a CCP should use central bank money (CeBM) for settling its transactions. If a CCP 
does not use CeBM, it should take appropriate measures to limit its cash settlement risks.53 
EMIR further requires CCPs to assess their liquidity and credit exposures on a near to real-time 
basis.54 In addition, it imposes several other prudential requirements on the CCP’s investment policy 
regarding its financial resources. The financial resources of a CCP should be invested in cash or 
highly liquid financial instruments with minimal market and credit risk.55 If not, the amount of capital 
(including retained earnings and reserves) cannot be taken into account for the purposes of dedicated 
own resources to be used according to the default waterfall. Such funds cannot also be calculated for 
                                                        
46 Art. 45 (4) EMIR 
47 Art. 41(4) EMIR 
48 Art. 45 (4) EMIR. More recently, EU regulatory technical standards (RTS) have been published on margin requirements 
for CCPs, based on article 11 of EMIR. See Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2016/2251 of 4 October 2016 
supplementing Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council on OTC derivatives, central 
counterparties and trade repositories with regard to regulatory technical standards for risk-mitigation techniques for OTC 
derivative contracts not cleared by a central counterparty, C/2016/6329; OJ L 340, 15.12.2016. 
49 European Central Bank, Financial Stability Review (May 2016), 106-08. 
50 Art. 41(1) EMIR 
51 Art. 46 EMIR 
52 Art. 46(1) EMIR 
53 Art. 50(1) EMIR 
54 Art. 40 EMIR 
55 Art. 47(1) EMIR 
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the purposes of meeting CCP’s capital requirements.56 Furthermore, margins or default fund 
contributions should be deposited with operators of securities settlements systems, ensuring full 
protection of those financial instruments.57 Asset separation rules apply where a CCP deposits assets 
with a third party.58 In its investment decisions, a CCP should also set acceptable concentration limits 
to its overall risk exposure to a single obligor.59 
In addition to EMIR’s liquidity requirements on CCPs,60 EMIR requires that CCPs should have access 
to credit lines or similar arrangements to meet their liquidity needs if their available financial 
resources are not immediately available.61 Only up to 25% of the credit line can be provided by a 
single clearing member, parent undertaking or subsidiary of the clearing member.62  
To cover the losses originating from the default of clearing members, in excess of the ones covered by 
margin requirements, a CCP is required to maintain a prefunded default fund. This fund helps limit 
the CCP’s credit exposure to its clearing members.63 Again, EMIR does not set minimum 
requirements, however, it requires the CCP to set a minimum amount for such funds.64 The default 
fund is composed of contributions of clearing members, which should be risk-based and proportional 
to the exposures of each clearing members.65 The default fund should enable the CCP to withstand the 
default of the clearing members to which the CCP has the largest exposures or in case that the sum of 
the second and third largest members is larger than the clearing member with the largest exposure, the 
default fund should enable the CCP to withstand their defaults.66 The CCP is allowed to establish 
several default funds for each class of financial instruments that it clears.67 Article 45 EMIR stipulates 
that in a default situation, the contributions of non-defaulting party can only be used if both the 
contributions of defaulting member and the dedicated own resources of the CCP has been exhausted.  
Additional sufficient prefunded available financial resources should be maintained by the CCP for 
covering potential losses exceeding the losses covered by margin requirements. These other financial 
resources consist of the CCP’s freely available dedicated resources and cannot be used for capital 
requirement purposes.68 The default fund and other financial resources should enable the CCP to 
withstand the default of at least the two clearing members with the largest exposures to CCP under 
                                                        
56 Art. 47(2) EMIR 
57 Art. 47(3) EMIR 
58 Art. 47(5) EMIR 
59 Art. 47(7) EMIR 
60 Art. 44 EMIR 
61 Art. 44(1) EMIR 
62 Art. 44(1) EMIR 
63 Art. 42(1) EMIR 
64 Art. 42(1) EMIR 
65 Art. 42(2) EMIR 
66 Art. 42(3) EMIR 
67 Art. 42(4) EMIR 
68 Art. 43(1) EMIR 
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extreme but plausible market conditions.69 CCPs can also require the non-defaulting clearing 
members to provide additional funds in the event of default of another clearing member.70  
This loss-sharing arrangement could potentially result in socialization of losses and eventually lead to 
adverse selection problems, in the sense that weak clearing members would always remain in the 
market and stronger ones would exit. Such a mechanism bears striking resemblance to ex-post 
funding of deposit insurance, which punishes the surviving good banks. In addition, similar to deposit 
insurance in banking, where ex-post contributions can be procyclical, ex-post loss-sharing 
arrangements in CCPs would not be immune to procyclicality. 
Among other safety enhancing measures is formalizing access to central bank liquidity facilities or 
certain insurance arrangements with a public backstop. This is more relevant in the case of provision 
of clearing services by non-bank CCPs, or CCPs not affiliated with banks. In principle, a CCP may 
find itself in need of additional or outside sources of liquidity in two instances. First is the intraday 
funding needs for ensuring the discharge of the daily payment obligations (e.g., variation margins). 
This liquidity need can be met by commercial banks and can only address operational risks. The 
second instance of liquidity needs would be under stressed circumstances or in times of systemic 
events leading to liquidity problems in CCPs, wherein a liquidity backstop from a central bank would 
be needed.  
In addition to the above prudential regulation framework applicable to the European CCPs, given 
their increasingly important role they play as part of the FMIs, a proposal for a new framework for 
orderly recovery and resolution of a CCPs is put forward at the EU level. The next section explores 
this framework with a view to identifying the potential shortcomings of this proposal. 
3.  Final line of defence: Recovery and resolution 
3.1. Current framework 
As CCPs conduct functions that are systemic, the objective of the prudential regulation of CCPs 
should be to make the need for recovery and resolution tools redundant.71 A failed CCP would imply 
that all the internal risk management policies and procedures as well as the EMIR safeguards have 
failed to contain the crisis. At the moment, a default by a clearing member holding a bank license 
means that bank resolution tools have also failed to deliver. That is in itself quite unlikely since bank 
resolution allows for banks to be resolved without bailing in certain liabilities that could generate 
                                                        
69 Art. 43(2) EMIR 
70 Art. 43(3) EMIR 
71 This is evidenced by the fact that CCP failures have been extremely rare, however, once they have failed, they have often 
resulted in market shutdown. For case studies of CCP failures, see Vincent Bignon and Guillaume Vuillemey, "The Failure 
of a Clearinghouse: Empirical Evidence," Banque de France Working Paper No. 638  (2017).; Bob Hills et al., "Central 
Counterparty Clearing Houses and Financial Stability," Financial Stability Review, Bank of England 6, no. 2 (1999).; Robert 
T. Cox, David Murphy, and Edward Budding, "Central Counterparties in Crisis: International Commodities Clearing House, 
New Zealand Futures and Options Exchange and the Stephen Francis Affair," Journal of Financial Market Infrastructures 4, 
no. 3 (2016). https://doi.org/10.21314/JFMI.2016.054. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3188844 
 13 
contagion risks; such liabilities could be the banks’ obligations to CCPs.72 However, despite all the 
existing safeguards, a failure of a major CCP is not entirely unlikely, especially if such a failure 
originates from the failure of multiple clearing members. The recent studies on CCP 
interdependencies leave raised concerns about such an eventuality. For example, exposures to CCPs 
are concentrated among a small number of institutions, and the contribution by the largest 20 out of 
307 clearing members (included in this analysis) account for approximately 75% of total financial 
resources (initial margin and default fund) that those members provide to CCPs.73 This study also 
indicates that the default of a CCP’s top two clearing members could result in defaults of the same 
entity or affiliates in up to 23 other CCPs included in the analysis.74 Although the current EU bank 
recovery and resolution regime is applicable to CCPs holding a banking license, it leaves the non-
bank CCPs out of its scope, which could prove to be a potential source of risk for CCPs. 
The CCP recovery and resolution regimes differ across jurisdictions.75 In the UK, the legislative 
framework has been amended to provide CCP recovery and resolution tools to the CCP supervisor, 
i.e., the Bank of England in its functionally separate resolution authority.76 The objectives of the 
recovery and resolution framework include ensuring the continuity of CCP core services, avoiding the 
use of public funds, avoiding interference with property rights, protecting financial stability, and 
enhancing public confidence in the financial system. However, given the fact that there is no 
hierarchical order among those objectives, it is clear that this framework diverges from the spirit of 
the bank recovery and resolution framework, which prioritizes the use of private funds within a 
resolution. In this framework, recovery plans are linked to the establishment of loss allocation 
mechanisms to be activated once the default resources envisaged under EMIR are depleted. 
Resolution plans are mainly linked to the power to sell part or all of the CCP business and to establish 
a bridge institution. Compensation to the affected parties can be provided. Unilateral (non-
contractual) loss absorption mechanisms are, however, missing.  
Current recovery and resolution frameworks in different member states are significantly varied. For 
example, in Italy, the resolution framework for FMIs was extended to CCPs.77 It now includes a 
Special Administration Regime (SAR), aimed at preserving the CCP’s business continuity, and a 
Compulsory Administrative Liquidation Regime (CALR). A CCP may be subject to the SAR if 
serious irregularities in the management of the CCP and/or serious capital shortfalls arise. On the 
other hand, it might be placed under the CALR if authorisation has been withdrawn by the competent 
                                                        
72 Art. 44(3) BRRD 
73 BCBS et al., "Analysis of Central Clearing Interdependencies."; See also BCBS et al., "Analysis of Central Clearing 
Interdependencies,"  (9 August 2018). 
74 BCBS et al., "Analysis of Central Clearing Interdependencies." 
75 European Commission, "Impact Assessment Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on a 
Framework for the Recovery and Resolution of Central Counterparties and Amending Regulations (Eu) No 1095/2010, (Eu) 
No 648/2012, and (Eu) 2015/2365 {Swd(2016) 369 Final},"  (28.11.2016). 
76 The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Over the Counter Derivatives, Central Counterparties and Trade 
Repositories) (No. 2) Regulations 2013 
77 Commission, "Impact Assessment Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on a 
Framework for the Recovery and Resolution of Central Counterparties and Amending Regulations (Eu) No 1095/2010, (Eu) 
No 648/2012, and (Eu) 2015/2365 {Swd(2016) 369 Final}," 12. 
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supervisory authority – the Bank of Italy – or the courts have declared the CCP to be insolvent. As 
part of this regime, the operations of the CCP would be frozen, all CCP payments would be 
suspended, and contracts would be terminated. In France and Germany, CCPs are required to have a 
banking license.78 Consequently, their authorities have the powers envisaged under the BRRD. 
However, in that case not all tools can be effectively applied to CCPs. 
Overall, the current framework is fragmented and there is significant uncertainty as to the treatment of 
a failed CCP in each of those jurisdictions. However, in countries where large CCPs are established, 
different variations of recovery and resolution measures are already in place. It appears, however, that 
the role of bail-in is currently non-existent, and priority is given to the use of the sale of business tool 
combined with the provision of public funding. Indeed, on the one hand, assuming that the failure of 
the CCP has not resulted from an external shock (e.g., hacking) but is the outcome of a systemic 
crisis, bailing-in the clearing members could prove to be detrimental to financial stability. On the 
other hand, though, in case of a large CCP, trying to apply resolution without bail-in could prove 
catastrophic for its home country. In addition, a main challenge is that, given the lack of proper 
recovery and resolution planning, trying to understand and preserve the different critical functions of 
a CCP within strict time limits will be challenging, to say the least. 
3.2. Future developments 
In the future, the European proposal for the recovery and resolution of CCPs (the Proposal) is to put 
in place a harmonized framework for CCP recovery and resolution. In this section we examine this 
proposal by drawing comparisons to its banking equivalent and drafting model, the BRRD, as well as 
the BRRD’s version for Banking Union countries, the Single Resolution Mechanism Regulation 
(SRMR).79 
In the EU, the rules governing bank recovery and resolution are integrated within the BRRD and the 
SRMR. The SRMR establishes the resolution framework applied to all Eurozone Member States and 
sets out the rules regarding the functions and operations of the European resolution authority, the 
Single Resolution Board (SRB), whereas the BRRD sets a harmonized resolution framework for all 
non-Eurozone countries. Whilst the substantive components of the two texts are identical, the 
difference lies in the procedural framework related to the enforcement of the rule, as the BRRD – in 
contrast to the SRMR – contains a purely national, non-centralised enforcement system. That said, as 
the analysis of the Proposal unfolds, the comparison with the BRRD and SRMR is used to identify 
similarities, divergences, and weaknesses therein. 
                                                        
78 Ibid. 
79 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 July 2014 establishing uniform rules 
and a uniform procedure for the resolution of credit institutions and certain investment firms in the framework of a Single 
Resolution Mechanism and a Single Resolution Fund and amending Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, OJ L 225, 30.7.2014, p. 
1–90. (Hereinafter SRMR). 
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Faithful to the BRRD model, the Proposal sets rules related to the treatment of a CCP at an early 
stage, when it is under financial distress but remains solvent (recovery phase), and rules that relate to 
the later stage when CCP failure cannot be prevented, and liquidation should be avoided on financial 
stability grounds (resolution phase).  
Within the CCP recovery framework, CCPs are required to draw up and maintain a recovery plan to 
be implemented in case of financial distress,80 following the triggering of certain indicators that are 
chosen by the CCP and agreed by the regulator.81 The plans need to be submitted to and approved by 
the competent resolution authorities.82 Moreover, those plans undergo a resolvability assessment 
aiming at identifying potential material impediments to an effective recovery (and resolution). In this 
context, structural, financial or organizational measures might be ordered by the resolution authorities 
to improve the CCP’s resolvability. The plan is also provided to the EMIR college of the CCP to 
allow its members to analyse the consequences of the potential implementation of the plan to clearing 
members, their clients and the financial markets served by the CCP.83  
As required by the Commission, recovery measures should take the form of a contractual arrangement 
between the CCPs and their clearing members in accordance with the pre-agreed operating rules. 
Such contractual arrangements might include: tearing up contracts – terminating contracts so that 
losses and gains can be crystallized – in order to re-match the CCP’s book; establishing voluntary 
agreements such as auctions with the remaining clearing members so that they can voluntarily take on 
positions or to arrange ‘cash calls’ – that is requiring clearing members to provide additional 
resources; and ‘variation margin haircutting’ – that is haircutting payments due to the clearing 
members as a result of profits gained in a derivatives contract.84 As examined below, the said 
measures can also be used as resolution measures with the difference that the former are integrated 
within the operating rules of the CCP, and thus clearing members have an upfront indication on the 
measures that can have direct implications for their own financial situation, and can therefore better 
calibrate their own risk management strategy.85 Beyond those included in the recovery plan, recovery 
measures can go as far as contacting potential buyers as resolution is approaching, requiring structural 
and/or operational changes to the CCP, or removing the senior management and the board of the 
CCP.86 
In terms of resolution, and given the precedent of BRRD and EMIR, CCP resolution authorities are 
required to establish and chair resolution colleges for each CCP. These colleges shall consist 
primarily of the EMIR college participants,87 plus all the different competent resolution authorities.88 
                                                        
80 Art. 9(1) of the Proposal. 
81 Art. 9(2) of the Proposal. 
82 Art. 9(4) of the Proposal & Art. 10(1) of the Proposal. 
83 Randy Priem, "Ccp Recovery and Resolution: Preventing a Financial Catastrophe,"  (2017): 13.. 
84 Ibid. 
85 Ibid. 
86 Art. 20 of the Proposal. 
87 Namely, ESMA, the CCP’s competent authority, the competent authorities that supervise the clearing members of the 
CCP that are established in the three member states with the largest contributions to the default fund of the CCP, the 
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Content-wise, resolution authorities draft resolution plans according to the guidelines set out in the 
Proposal,89 which again mirrors the BRRD adjusted to the specificities of a CCP’s operations. 
Assessment of resolvability is part of resolution planning as is for recovery planning;90 hence, 
structural, organizational, and financial measures can be imposed here as well.91 Resolution colleges 
need to agree upon the resolution plans. If no agreement is achieved within the colleges, the (national) 
resolution authority itself will be the one to decide upon those measures.92 However, especially 
regarding the resolvability measures that relate to the structural and operational aspects of the CCP, 
any member of the resolution college can refer to ESMA, whose decision through mediation will then 
be binding upon the national resolution authority.93 
In the execution phase of resolution, the conditions for resolution are identical as in the BRRD, 
namely that the CCP is failing or likely to fail (FOLTF), that no private sector alternatives to 
resolution are available, and that the resolution is justified on public interest grounds to achieve the 
resolution objectives that normal insolvency proceedings would fail to do.94 The triggering 
mechanism, according to the Proposal, remains strictly in the hands of the national resolution 
authority, who is competent to make the said assessments. However, compared to bank resolution, 
here the EMIR college will likely signal to the national authority that a FOLTF assessment has to be 
made since the college receives sufficient data on a monthly basis to make such an assessment.  
Nonetheless, there are certain principles that need to be followed in resolution.95 All contractual 
obligations and arrangements need to be exhausted first before the entry into resolution, unless the 
resolution authority decides that their partial use is preferable in order to preserve the CCP’s critical 
functions, financial stability and the rest of the resolution objectives.96 The rest are identical to the 
principles applied in bank resolution, namely shareholders bear losses before creditors, pari passu 
principle is to be applied, as well as the No Creditor Worse Off principle (NCWO).97  
With respect to the resolution tools available to the resolution authorities, there is greater flexibility 
provided in the proposal than in BRRD. In particular, there are four specific measures included in the 
                                                                                                                                                                            
competent authorities responsible for the supervision of trading venues served by the CCP, the competent authorities 
supervising CCPs with which interoperability arrangements have been established, the competent authorities supervising 
CSDs that are linked to the CCP, the relevant members of the ESCB, and the central banks of issue of the most relevant 
union currencies. Article 4 of the Proposal. 
88 The resolution authority of the CCP, the resolution authorities of the clearing members of the CCP that are established in 
the three member states with the largest contributions to the default fund of the CCP, the resolution authorities of the CCPs 
with which interoperability arrangements have been established, the competent authority of the parent undertaking, if 
applicable, the competent ministry and the European Banking Authority (EBA). Art. 4 of the Proposal. 
89 Art. 13 of the Proposal. 
90 Art. 16 of the Proposal. 
91 Art. 17(7) of the Proposal. 
92 Art. 18(3) of the Proposal. 
93 Art. 18(4) of the Proposal. 
94 Art. 12(1) of the Proposal. 
95 Art. 23 of the Proposal. 
96 Banking practice has shown that emphasis is given to these two objectives, see Silvia Merler, "Critical Functions and 
Public Interest in Banking Services: Need for Clarification? Banking Union Scrutiny. Bruegel Report, November 2017,"  
(2017).; Willem Pieter de Groen, "The Provision of Critical Functions at Global, National or Regional Level. Is There a 
Need for Further Legal/Regulatory Clarification If Liquidation Is the Default Option for Failing Banks? Ceps Special 
Report, 19 December 2017,"  (2017). 
97 Art. 23(e) of the Proposal. 
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Proposal; position and loss allocation tools,98 write-down and conversion tools, sale of business tool, 
and the bridge CCP tool.99 Apart from that, resolution authorities have the power to implement any 
other resolution tool consistent with the resolution objectives and the general resolution principles. 
The position allocation tool (PAT)100 aims to rematch the books of the CCP or the bridge CCP where 
relevant. The execution of the PAT takes place through the partial or full termination of contracts, 
which falls within the competence of the resolution authority. The full termination of contracts is, 
however, unlikely as it could generate systemic risks due to the simultaneous loss allocation across 
the members of the CCP, which would leave them unhedged at the most critical point trying to 
rebalance their books at the time of financial distress.101 The systemic concerns arise from 
considerations that are similar to those in bank resolution, where senior creditors are not bailed-in 
despite clear rules providing that they should be part of the bail-in process. 
Regarding the loss allocation tool (LAT), the proposal refers to the variation margin gains haircutting 
(VMGH)102 and the resolution cash calls.103 The former allows the resolution authority to reduce or 
cancel due variation margin payments to non-defaulting clearing members, while it would continue to 
accept variation margin payments from the members as usual; this has been characterized as a very 
effective resolution tool,104 even though it tends to create procyclical effects and is not suitable for 
non-default losses, or for instruments such as repo transactions where margins are not being used.105 
Initial margin haircutting is not included (but neither excluded) in the Proposal – aligned with the 
provisions of EMIR – because, similar to risk-based capital requirements or initial margin 
requirements, it would lead to pro-cyclical effects due the lack of collateral and the need to trigger 
immediate margin calls.106 Moreover, initial margin haircutting would be self-defeating, because it 
                                                        
98 The position and loss allocation tool can also be part of the recovery plan. However, it needs to be performed 
contractually, namely, it has to be integrated in advance in the CCP’s operational rules and cannot be imposed unilaterally 
by the resolution authority as is the case in resolution. See Priem, "Ccp Recovery and Resolution: Preventing a Financial 
Catastrophe," 12.. 
99 Art. 27 of the Proposal. 
100 Art. 29 of the Proposal.  
101 Thomas Huertas, "How to Deal with the Resolution of Financial Market Infrastructures,"  (2016).. CPMI and IOSCO also 
argue against a full termination of contracts, see Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures and Technical 
Committee of the International Organization of Securities Board of the International Organization of Securities 
Commissions, "Recovery of Financial Market Infrastructure," (Basel, Switzerland: Bank for International Settlements and 
International Organization of Securities Commissions, 2017). 
102 Art. 30 of the Proposal. 
103 Art. 31 of the Proposal. 
104 Rama Cont, "The End of the Waterfall: Default Resources of Central Counterparties," Journal of Risk Management in 
Financial Institutions 8, no. 4 (2015). 
105 Priem, "Ccp Recovery and Resolution: Preventing a Financial Catastrophe," 13. 
106 Where a deterioration in the positions of a clearing member would trigger additional margin calls, providing extra 
margins by that clearing member would further deteriorate its position and lead to amplifying effects of the shocks to that 
clearing member. Haircuts on initial margins would effectively work in the same manner and would aggravate the financial 
difficulties in times of distress. See also International Swaps and Derivatives Association, CCP Loss Allocation at the End of 
the Waterfall, 2013 available at: available at: https://www2.isda.org/...==/CCP_loss_allocation_waterfall_0807; Nasdaq 
Clearing. (2014), Recovery and resolution for CCPs, available at: 
http://business.nasdaq.com/Docs/Recovery%20and%20Resolution%20for%20CCPs.pdf;  
LCH.Clearnet. (2014), Recovery and resolution: a framework for CCPs, available at: 
http://www.lch.com/documents/731485/762444/-and-resolution-a-framework-for-ccps.pdf/. 
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threatens to affect the critical function of the CCP as soon as its capacity to ensure counterparty 
performance deteriorates.107  
With respect to the sale of business tool108 and the bridge CCP tool,109 the resolution authority may 
transfer to a purchaser or to a bridge CCP owned by the resolution authority all instruments of 
ownership issued by a CCP under resolution and any assets, rights, obligations or liabilities of the 
CCP in question. The transfer takes place without the consent of the shareholders of the CCP and – 
compared to BRRD – without the purchaser having the authorization to provide clearing services, as 
long as the new entity has the operational capacity to perform the CCP’s critical functions and adjusts 
its risk management policy accordingly.110 
Moreover, inherent in the utility of the sale of business tool or the bridge bank tool is the power to 
break an institution into a good and a bad institution. In bank resolution framework, a bank can be 
broken into a good and a bad bank, with the aim of avoiding a disruption in the critical functions. This 
framework also allows for granting priority to certain creditors. However, a potential failure in a 
typical bank is likely to result in the failure of its entire business model. In the case of CCPs the 
situation is similar. Some CCPs’ business models and balance sheet structures are complex enough to 
include not only clearing functions, but also other activities such as portfolio compression techniques 
and tri-party repo management. In these cases, certain functions could indeed be saved, and the rest 
could be left in a ‘bad’ CCP.  
Government financial stabilization tools are the last-resort mechanism to rescue the CCP in 
resolution. However, compared to BRRD, here the framework seems more flexible. Under BRRD, 
any recourse to public financing needs to take place only after the full 8% of the bank’s liabilities 
have been bailed-in. In the case of CCPs, the only limits to the use of public funds is the limited 
burden-sharing under the State aid rules,111 and the requirement that the other resolution tools have 
been assessed and exploited to the maximum extent practicable whilst maintaining financial 
stability.112 
4. Regulatory shortcomings and potential future risks 
The aforementioned lines of defence, including the prudential rules and proposed recovery and 
resolution plans suffer from certain shortcomings to which we return in this section. These 
shortcomings involve externalities that need to be internalized, collective action problems in the 
proposed resolution of CCPs as well as broader enforcement weaknesses inherent in the Proposal.  
                                                        
107 Mr Manmohan Singh and Dermot Turing, Central Counterparties Resolution—an Unresolved Problem (International 
Monetary Fund, 2018). 
108 Art. 40, 41 of the Proposal. 
109 Art. 42, 43 of the Proposal. 
110 Adam Ketessidis, "Resolving Systemically Important Financial Institutions and Markets," in The New International 
Financial System: Analyzing the Cumulative Impact of Regulatory Reform (World Scientific, 2016). 
111 Art. 45(1)(c) of the Proposal. 
112 Art. 45(1)(b) of the Proposal. 
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4.1. Externalities 
The sources of heretofore unaddressed externalities in CCP business mainly comes from the 
misaligned incentives originating from moral hazard problems resulting in externalities. Although a 
CCP is incentivized to avoid the risk of default by means of capital requirements - a mechanism that 
increases the CCP’s skin in the game - and default funds, it is unlikely for the CCP to internalize the 
systemic risk that would arise from its operations.113 Under EMIR, margin requirements are 
mandatory for centrally cleared derivatives, however, the regulation does not require setting margins 
at any specific level and it is up to the CCP to set the margins.114 Because the CCP is a prudentially 
regulated financial institution, regulation expects that the CCP will set the margins at the optimal 
level. However, the CCP would not internalize the potential systemic risks of its operations. This is 
particularly true for the for-profit CCPs that are found to be undercapitalized and set lower 
collateral/margin requirements.115 This means that this type of CCPs is more likely to privatize profits 
and socialize losses.  
Furthermore, given that CCPs are highly likely to be considered too-big, too-interconnected or too-
important-to-fail, their incentives would not be aligned with those of the society due to the moral 
hazard problem arising from being recognized as such. 116 This is why strong and harmonized 
regulatory minimum margin standards have been proposed.117 In addition, systemic liquidity events 
necessitate extending central bank liquidity facilities to CCPs, and in many jurisdictions such a 
liquidity backstop has been made available to CCPs. In Europe, Article 85(1)(a) of EMIR opens up 
the possibility for CCPs to have access to central bank liquidity facilities by mandating the 
Commission to assess, in cooperation with the members of the European System of Central Banks 
(ESCB), the need for any measure to facilitate the CCPs’ access to central bank liquidity facilities. In 
some jurisdictions, such as the U.S., only banks (depository institutions) used to have access to central 
bank liquidity facilities.118 Although the Dodd-Frank Act does not expressly allow access to the 
Federal Reserve (Fed) liquidity facilities to CCPs, currently in the U.S. (and likewise in the UK), such 
access is granted.119 In those jurisdictions, where CCPs do not have direct access to central bank 
liquidity, it is of great importance for the CCP to have a banking license. 
However, the dilemma in providing access to central bank liquidity facilities for CCPs is that it can 
increase the risk of moral hazard, as it is the case with any type of safety net. For example, such 
access to liquidity can encourage the CCP to offer lower margin requirements for its clearing 
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members. This problem can be amplified in case of too-big or too-important-to-fail CCPs. To mitigate 
the risks of moral hazard, access to liquidity facilities can be made subject to the Bagehot/Thornton 
rule and it should not be provided in lighter terms than that which is provided to banks and where 
possible should be subject to conditionality and enhanced supervision.120 
4.2. Resolution governance and collective action problem 
 In terms of governance of the CCP recovery and resolution, it is only natural that enforcement will 
face significant challenges when resolution colleges include at least 14 different authorities reflecting 
in certain cases different national interests. On the one hand, pluralism is important when drafting 
resolution plans; but then, why not include more stakeholders, such as the competent authorities of the 
largest clearing members of the CCP, even if those users do not contribute – at least materially - to the 
default fund, but are systemically important to one Member State.121 The cross-border dimension of 
decisions is crucial since it affects not only the interests of banks, shareholders, and creditors in other 
countries, but also the interests of foreign taxpayers; home authorities are likely to try to save the 
CCP, whilst host authorities would likely focus on the protection of their local clearing members. For 
this reason, according to the Proposal, resolution plans need to be jointly agreed by all college 
members and they need to clearly specify the impact that their implementation shall have on clearing 
members and their clients, on the financial markets served by the CCP, on any linked financial 
institutions, and on the financial system as a whole.  
That said, the plurality of participants in resolution colleges could cause indecision or significant 
delays in decision-making. The economic literature suggests that in a repeated, cooperative public 
goods game with a small number of players and the presence of an effective threat of punishment, 
cooperation for the provision of public goods (e.g., provision of effective mechanisms for recovery 
and resolution) is likely to emerge.122 However, as the number of players increases, it is more likely 
that the cooperation would fail, because “as the number of participants becomes critically large, the 
individual will more and more come to treat the behavior of “all others” as beyond his own possible 
range of influence.”123  
This plurality of voices reflects both on resolution planning and resolution execution. First, in 
resolution planning it is important that all potential impediments to resolvability have been removed 
and all possible measures during the assessment phase have been taken; i.e. structural and 
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organizational measures. That should improve the chances for a successful resolution and reduce the 
risks arising from moral hazard. Nevertheless, given the pluralism of different interests within the 
resolution colleges, it is highly unlikely that any such measures will be suggested. Second, when it 
comes to implementing the resolution plan, the resolution authority is not bound by it, and can deviate 
as long as it informs the resolution college and justifies the reasons underlying this deviation. This 
undermines the credibility of the execution process of a CCP resolution plan. Lessons from the BRRD 
suggest that the success of those provisions depends on the predictability of the economic outcome of 
the aforementioned actions for the CCP, their clearing members, other stakeholders and ultimately for 
any direct or indirect costs that may arise for the taxpayer.124 Only if all authorities’ national interests 
are served to a sufficient extent, will they refrain from isolationist approaches. 
In that respect, looking into the BRRD ‘better brother’, the SRMR, it would be useful to draw 
comparative conclusions. Under the SRMR, the SRB is competent to define in its executive session – 
thus, without the National Resolution Authorities’ (NRAs’) approval – the resolution policies to be 
applied in all Member States. This effectively means that the entire resolution planning and execution 
is designed by the SRB, thus striping the NRAs of their powers and turning them into mere agents. 
Moreover, the SRB is the authority to conduct the resolvability assessment, which can ultimately lead 
to instructing the NRAs to take very intrusive measures against the institution concerned.125 
Therefore, even though legitimacy and accountability concerns have been raised due to the extensive 
powers of the SRB as an EU agency,126 the GFC has proved that mechanisms built on consultations 
and cooperation among different national authorities are ineffective in times of crises, because the 
home authority is expected to be primarily concerned about the impact of the resolution on its own 
jurisdiction and to apply more isolationist approach. The SRB has thus come to the forefront as a 
necessity,127 and should be considered as part of the Proposal as well. 
4.3. Practical impediments 
Regarding the distinction between recovery and resolution, there are four main reasons why recovery 
measures are unlikely to be used. First, even though CCPs are heavily regulated and supervised, it 
would still be likely that the supervisory authorities might not acknowledge in a timely manner the 
fact that recovery proceedings may need to be initiated.128 The latter is also consistent with the 
supervisors’ likely initial forbearance when a national financial institution is under financial 
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distress.129 Consequently, resolution will most likely be required by the time the competent authority 
reacts.  
Second, even though resolution authorities can exceptionally be the same entities as the supervisory 
ones130 this legal exception has become the standard practice in bank resolution.131 Notwithstanding 
the functional and organizational separation measures that can be put in place,132 it is likely that the 
national resolution authority would genuinely avoid questioning the work of the supervisory authority 
or favouring short-term fiscally beneficial solutions which can lead to significant delays in taking 
resolution action. Such architectural deficiencies may render early intervention inapplicable as well, 
given the inertia of the national supervisory and resolution authorities. 
Third, as in the case of BRRD, the distinction between recovery and resolution is often blurred. In 
other words, resolution objectives are clear because resolution is the endgame of an entity’s 
operations, whereas in recovery that is not the case. Recovery bears resemblance to a ‘know-thyself’ 
process rather than a credible mechanism that can improve the entity’s chances of viability. Given the 
different structural and organizational attributes of a CCP compared to a credit institution, and the 
larger amount of the liquidity risk borne by CCPs – especially after standardized OTC derivatives’ 
clearing became mandatory – it is important that CCPs and their supervisory and resolution 
authorities identify the flaws in CCPs’ risk model in order to avoid failure.  
Fourth, much more than in bank resolution, CCP resolution seems to be a one-way road in that 
liquidation is an unlikely option, because in the extreme scenario of failure what matters is that all 
accounts can be ported to another CCP and trading (and clearing) can continue. In particular, CCPs’ 
critical functions are closely linked to the clearing of derivative contracts and liquidating a CCP 
would automatically lead to a disruption of these clearing functions. Thus, it seems difficult to 
understand at the moment how an authority could rule against the existence of public interest that 
would justify resolution. Having said so, there are no provisions in the Proposal that can effectively 
deal with the mitigation of such financial risks linked to the closure of a CCP,133 and given the fact 
that normal insolvency proceedings vary significantly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, perhaps the 
Commission should also include common liquidation rules for CCPs.134 Such rules would also reduce 
the moral hazard risks that are significant given the current architecture of the Proposal. 
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5. Structural reforms as additional venues for strengthening CCP 
resilience 
The discussion of the ex-ante and ex-post regulation and resolution mechanisms and their 
shortcomings suggest that there is still room for improvements in terms of reforming the regulation 
and resolution mechanisms of CCPs. Thus far, we have highlighted the limitations of the current CCP 
regulatory regimes and have made suggestions to address such shortcomings, we now turn to 
discussing the potential reforms that can make CCPs more resilient in the face of financial distress by 
focusing on the potential improvements to the organizational and market structure of CCPs, as well as 
improvements to the proposal on the recovery and resolution. Therefore, in addition to addressing the 
shortcomings of the ex-ante and ex-post measures, certain structural measures would be considered. 
The bank-CCP nexus, in particular in OTC derivatives clearing, originate from the existence of large 
exposures and interlinkages between small number of systemically important banks and even smaller 
number of systemically important CCPs.135 In this context, the clearing members and their affiliates 
are also significant providers of other critical services (such as credit, liquidity and settlement 
services) to CCPs and can have various relationships with several CCPs, resulting in a setting in 
which a small number of entities dominate each clearing network.136 Given these interconnectedness 
and the potential existing contagion channels between CCP clearing and other lines of businesses of a 
clearing entity, there seems to be a room for certain structural regulation in CCP clearing activities. 
In banking regulation, structural measures have a relatively long history, which goes back to the 
Glass-Steagall Act.137 More recent permutations of such measures focus on prohibiting bank 
proprietary trading and banking entities’ investment in and sponsorship of private funds, or ring-
fencing and subsidiarization as adopted in certain European jurisdictions.138 In the EU, this discussion 
was formalized with the Liikanen report139 and the subsequent Commission’s proposal on a regulation 
on banking structural reforms.140 However, the proposal was finally withdrawn at the end of 2017 on 
the grounds that it was impossible to accurately estimate the costs and benefits and the trade-off 
between market efficiency and financial stability.  
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Although the doors for imposing structural measures at the EU levels appease to be closed for the 
foreseeable future, such measures have found a backdoor to enter. Currently these measures can be 
imposed in the bank recovery and resolution framework, and the same would apply to CCPs under the 
Proposal. In particular, under the BRRD, the SRMR, and the Proposal, resolution authorities can - as 
part of resolution planning - order any institution to apply measures that can be of structural or 
financial nature, or can involve additional information disclosure requirements, on which the 
authorities have a wide discretion.141  
But unlike banking, structural regulation would take different forms in CCPs. This is because in 
addition to the nature of activities, the organizational structure of CCPs are also different from banks. 
FMIs have historically taken a variety of legal and organizational forms, functions and designs. They 
may be organized as associations of financial institutions, non-bank clearing corporations and 
specialized banking organizations. FMIs have also varying ownership structures. They may be owned 
and operated by central banks or by the private sector. They may be organized as for-profit or not-for-
profit entities.142 By the same token, CCPs have taken many legal forms. A CCP can be organized as a 
bank, or as a special purpose financial utility (SPV or SPE), or it can be owned and operated by an 
exchange in a vertically integrated structure. 
Due to various external drivers, in terms of the organizational and market structure, the CCP business 
model has taken four main structures: vertical integration along the value chains, horizontal 
integration, competition among CCPs, and vertical specialization with the emergence of niche service 
providers.143 However, two dominant models of CCPs resulting from a century-old history are 
vertically structured CCPs and horizontally structured CCPs. Vertically-structured CCPs are 
integrated within a corporate entity or group which provides a variety of services from trading to 
settlement. The vertical integration is the dominant pattern for futures exchanges around the globe.144 
Despite the various organizational and market structures, theoretical studies and empirical evidence 
show that no single CCP structure or even market structure in the CCP business is superior to 
another.145 
In addition to the organic developments in the organization and structure of CCPs, the law can also 
play a key role in shaping the structure of CCPs by deploying ex-ante structural regulation with the 
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aim of mitigating systemic risks. Structural regulation has historically been one of the main regulatory 
measures in regulating financial markets.146 In contrast to other modalities of regulation,147 which rely 
on rational human reasoning, structural regulation148 seeks to “eliminate undesirable behaviour by 
designing out the possibility for its occurrence.” This instrument seeks to remove the possibility of 
non-compliance by eliminating the possibility for the application of human discretion in its entirety.149 
This approach has a variety of applications in the regulation of cyberspace. In this perspective, the 
code is viewed as the architectural alternative for the deployment of legal rules.150 In other words, 
structural regulation creates “a ‘structure’ that will organize, constrain and channel activity.”151 
The ethos of post-GFC regulatory reforms is that regulation should be designed in such a way as to 
allow financial institutions to fail with minimum disruption to financial markets. In other words, the 
financial regulation should ensure that the markets could easily tolerate the failure of large financial 
institutions.152 Such an approach constitutes the core of the BRRD, and the SRMR, and more 
importantly the Proposal. However, as it is explained, it might not be workable for the FMIs.153 
The alternative approach is that the public policy objective should aim at making it extremely difficult 
for a CCP to fail,154 and the design and regulation of CCPs should be shaped as though they are too-
important-to-fail,155 because the expected social costs of a failure of a CCP would far exceed the 
expected cost of a safer design, even taking into account the costs of moral hazard and eventual 
bailouts. In this view, ex-ante structural measures could be deployed to achieve such an objective. For 
example, structural measures can be used to address some of the problems stemming from the 
interconnectedness of banking entities with CCPs.  
Structural measures in the CCP business model can take a variety of forms such as ring-fencing, 
requiring the CCP to be formed as a special purpose vehicle (SPV), imposing a mutually owned (user-
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owned) ownership structure or subsidiarisation requirement with the parent company having direct 
access to central bank liquidity facilities.156 In addition, restrictions on the affiliations with and 
investments in affiliates could be placed under structural measures. One major benefit of such 
structural measures and separation of banking and CCP business would be that such separation can 
function as a firewall and prevent the contagion of shocks from banks to CCPs and vice versa. 
As discussed under the recovery and resolution measures, according to the Proposal, certain structural 
measures can also be deployed under such measures. Under these rules, the competent authorities 
have the power to request from financial institutions to execute, inter alia, any kind of structural 
measure to improve the resolvability of the latter. As regards recovery plans, supervisory and 
resolution authorities can direct an institution to make specific changes to the plan in order to correct 
for any ‘material deficiencies’ or ‘material impediments’ identified therein;157 structural reforms being 
within the possible measures that can be requested. As regards resolution plans, resolution authorities 
are exclusively competent to draft them for each financial institution that falls under their scope. 
Again, as part of resolution planning and in the case that ‘material impediments to resolvability’ are 
identified, structural measures can be requested. In both cases, structural measures can include any 
form of legal and organizational restructuring, establishing a parent holding company, divesting 
certain businesses, etc.158 
Traditionally, there has been a very close relationship between CCP and banking business. This can 
partly be explained by the traditional bank-based European financial systems,159 European universal 
banking model,160 and the liquidity needs of the CCPs that necessitated access to central bank 
liquidity. However, a case can be made against comingling banking with CCPs as risks from banking 
activities might contaminate CCP functions. From this perspective, CCPs would better be organized 
as special purpose CCPs with direct access to central bank liquidity facilities.  
From a structural point of view, the clearing function of a bank is a systemic function and similar to 
core banking functions, which are separated under the ring-fencing requirements, can be separated or 
subsidiarized. In other words, structural regulation can be deployed to give CCPs such design features 
that would make it near fail-proof. However, the downside is that such a regulatory objective would 
inevitably create moral hazard. For example, the moral hazard aspect could stem from the lender of 
last resort services provided by the central bank to the CCP. This moral hazard problem can be 
reduced by restricting the scope of risk-taking activities of the CCP, as well as conservative pricing of 
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central bank liquidity.161 In any case, the scope for moral hazard in financial market utilities would be 
relatively narrow, and the design and regulation of some of the financial market utilities as if they 
were too-important-to-fail would be socially optimal. This line of reasoning leads to an argument for 
not mixing the operations and capital structure of financial market utilities with more complex 
financial institutions if the regulatory objective is to let the financial institutions fail.162  
Conclusion 
This paper studied both ex-ante and ex-post regulation of CCPs in Europe with a focus on EMIR and 
the European proposal for the recovery and resolution of CCPs. The aim of the ex-ante regulatory 
measures is to prevent the CCP from failing. Such measures are mainly included in EMIR. We also 
studied the ex-post regulatory measures - whose aim is to mitigate systemic risks after the failure of a 
CCP - which are mainly included in the European proposal for recovery and resolution of CCPs. 
Although, by way of backward induction, a credible resolution regime for CCPs can affect the 
sequence of optimal actions and decisions that the managers, shareholders and users of the CCP 
should take to avoid financial calamity, such a resolution regime - as is put forward in the Proposal - 
falls short of providing a credible resolution scheme for CCPs. In addition to potential concerns about 
externalities and misaligned incentives within the ex-ante prudential regulation framework, we have 
uncovered potential shortcomings, especially in terms of coordination failures both within the 
resolution colleges and between the competent resolution authority and resolution colleges, that could 
jeopardize a credible CCP recovery and resolution regime. In other words, it is likely that the current 
proposed special resolution regime for CCPs would fall short of creating incentives for the CCP’s 
users, owners, and managers to take socially optimal actions. These shortcomings in the Proposal 
would ultimately force the taxpayers to foot the bill.  
Given the limitations of the existing regulatory and resolution framework for CCPs and since the 
major CCPs are highly likely to become too-important-to-fail, strengthening ex-ante regulatory 
measures should take precedence over ex-post measures, in particular in terms of separating the 
operations and capital structure of CCPs from more complex financial institutions. This becomes 
extremely important if the regulatory objective is to make it extremely unlikely for a CCP to fail due 
to their too-interconnected-to-fail status, and to let other financial institutions fail without recourse to 
the taxpayer money.  
Future studies could investigate improving the Proposal by introducing mechanisms such as higher 
centralization of CCP resolution authorities – following the SRB model of SRMR – to mitigate 
potential coordination and holdout problems. In addition, addressing the specific shortcomings of the 
ex-ante regulation of CCPs can be an important research area within which structural regulation could 
be considered as a viable option. In this regard, future research could focus on investigating whether 
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162 Ibid., 252-53. 
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the structural separation of CCPs from other banking and financial institutions - modelled after utility 
companies - would fare better than the existing CCP structures. In case a complete separation would 
be infeasible for the CCPs integrated in a banking group, subsidiarization or ring-fencing measures 
could be examined to explore the potential for isolating the risks of activities in different sections of 
the firm from the risks originating from clearing functions.  
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